Stern: The Struggle for Poland by Abrams, Irwin
REVIEWS
pects of legal writing. It uses a Socratic method of putting questions to
expose ways of achieving rhetorical ends and improving illustrative passages.
Its text is largely the author's own production, whereas Cook's is composed
mainly of excerpts from other writers and from cases. Cook's volume has
more than twice as much material; the student will have to spend a large
part of his course time reading about drafting. Cooper's is intended to be used
in a course in which almost all the student's time will be devoted to writing.
Neither book is designed for the kind of course in which legal writing is
used to provide training in the use of research tools and in the synthesis of
the results of legal research-as well as training in writing in a narrower
sense. Probably no book could provide much help for such a course, which
necessarily calls for individual papers of the office memorandum or law review
comment type, and individual tutorial criticism. Since I feel that this kind
of skill-training is important and can be best taught in a legal writing course,
I am using Cooper's book for about half the semester only, and then assign-
ing more difficult individual research projects. In past years, I also used
mimeographed case materials prepared for use in Professor Harry Kalven's
course at the University of Chicago in skill-training in analyzing and syn-
thesizing a mass of cases. But even for such limited use, Cooper's is a very
useful book. I know of no better single source of instruction in legal writing,
and students need some of the shorter exercises it provides before they em-
bark on a major paper that will take several weeks.
The book is a slender one, but it has much meaty material in it-quite
enough to keep students busy for a semester, even in courses that exclude
some of the materials covered, such as statutes or pleadings.
HENRY WEIHOFEN't
THE STRUGGLE FOR PoLAND. By H. Peter Stem. Washington: Public
Affairs Press, 1953. Pp. 79. $2.00.
THE freedom and independence of Poland were the issues over which the
Second World War began; yet the War's aftermath left that unhappy country
as a full-fledged Soviet satellite. Mr. Stem's little volume is an account of
how this came about. Basing his account on Western materials, he follows
step by step the purposeful moves of the Kremlin, the ineffective actions of
the Western powers, and the contributions which members of the Polish
Government-in-Exile themselves made to the final result. He has done a
clear and succinct job.
Much of the Western writing on this subject has stressed "the betrayal of
Poland." Mr. Stem is properly critical of these writers, for, as he points out,
they "ignore the difference between what was desirable and what was pos-
sible."' His own study is more objective and is documented with care, but
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in an important regard his position does not appear so very different after
all from these tendentious efforts. According to Mr. Stern, "Poland's chance
of survival as a democracy depended upon Western diplomacy." 2 He blames
the Western diplomats, not for having lost sight of the objective of a free
Poland or for appeasing the Soviet Union, but for their ineptness in carrying
out the details of their policy.
But does Mr. Stern also confuse the desirable with the possible? Suppose,
as he suggests, that American policy-makers had been more aware of Soviet
machinations in Poland and less determined to postpone all political decisions
until after the War. Or suppose, as he also does, that the Western powers
at Yalta had sought more precise agreements as to the composition of the
Polish government or the nature of the elections which were to be held. Or
even suppose that Mr. Churchill had been successful in winning Mr. Tru-
man to the plan for which he was so desperately pleading at the end of the
War-to hold the Allied armies from retreating to the lines of occupation
agreed upon until the Russians had made concessions in Poland. Even if the
Western bargaining position had been thus enhanced, the fact remained that
the Red Army occupied the country. As Mr. Stettinius wrote in explanation
of the Yalta agreement: "As a result of the military situation it was not a
question of what Great Britain and the United States would permit Russia
to do in Poland, but what the two countries could persuade the Soviet Union
to accept." 3 And what the Soviet Union was prepared to accept, i.e., what it
meant by "a Poland friendly to Russia," was something different from what
the Western statesmen at Yalta had meant by the same phrase. When Mr.
Churchill later urged Marshal Stalin to accept as members of the new
Polish government persons who were "not fundamentally anti-Soviet," and
to exclude only those who were "extremely unfriendly towards Russia,"
Stalin's reply was a blunt negative. He insisted on restricting the choice to
persons actively pro-Soviet.4
To the Soviet leadership, the best security appeared to mean not merely a
government in Poland politically friendly, but a government ideologically allied
to the Soviet Union. As the life threat from Germany receded, the Bolshevik
ideology-an ideology which 'views the world as a place where whoever is
not with us is against us-was reasserting itself in the minds of the Soviet
rulers. And in Poland, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Soviet leaders
were physically able to go about attaining Russian security in their own way.
It is difficult to believe with Mr. Stem that when the Russians were in such
an excellent position to achieve their maximum ends, they could have been
prevailed upon by Western diplomats to settle for less.
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